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Clearing the Air: The Misguided Ruling of EME
Homer and the Future of Interstate Pollution
Regulation
“Administrative law is not for sissies.”1
INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia is right—administrative law is certainly not for
sissies. The ever-expanding role of the federal government means
amplified power for our federal agencies, those entities responsible
for implementing the policy goals of our government.2 This increased
responsibility of federal agencies comes from congressionally passed
statutes increasing or modifying the authority of the particular agency
it pertains to. Many of these agencies regulate pursuant to
exceedingly wordy and confusing statutes that deal with very
complex issues; these statutes define the metaphorical “red tape.”
Indeed, administrative law is not for sissies.
The Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Defense
Resource Council Inc., formulated one of the most important judicial
principles in the administrative law realm.3 The seminal legal doctrine
that emerged from that case stressed judicial deference to
“reasonable” agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts.4 A
basic rationale used in support of judicial deference, both before and
after the Chevron decision, is that agencies, because of their expertise
in their regulatory area, are more likely than a court to reach a correct
result policy-wise.5 It is also true, however, that many federal judges
consider it their duty to say what the law is. Thus, in the years since
Chevron, many courts have rolled back the degree of judicial
deference in many areas of administrative law.6

Copyright, 2013, by SPENCER KING.
1. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 511 (1989).
2. See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors
in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2000).
3. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
4. Id. at 845.
5. Scalia, supra note 1, at 514.
6. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 35 WTR ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS 3, 4 (2010) (stating that “[p]erhaps the greatest problem in the application of
the Chevron doctrine is that the Court very quickly abandoned the original,
apparently highly deferential, version of the doctrine and replaced it with multiple
versions that, if followed, can lead to different results.”).
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The Clean Air Act was enacted by Congress in 1970 as the
principal source of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
authority in regulating the country’s air pollution.7 Because of the
vast amount of regulations the national environment demands,
Congress, through the Clean Air Act, delegated a large amount of
power to the EPA in setting air quality standards.8 Interstate
pollution, or the transport of fine particulate matter pollutants across
state lines, is an area of utmost importance in environmental
regulatory efforts.9 Research suggests that these sorts of pollutants
cause the premature deaths of thousands of people annually,10 as
well as causing drastic increases in healthcare costs from respiratory
illness.11 The EPA’s authority to regulate interstate pollution is
derived from the Clean Air Act’s good neighbor provision,12 a
statute that Congress has periodically amended in order to give the
EPA a greater amount of regulatory authority over such pollution.13
However, the D.C. Circuit, in invalidating the last two major EPA
regulatory schemes addressing the issue, has proven to be a
significant barrier to its effective regulation.
The D.C. Circuit’s most recent opinion concerning interstate
pollution, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, likely posits
the most significant setback yet to EPA regulatory efforts. The D.C.
panel’s majority opinion misapplied prior case law to substantiate a
rationale and ruling that clearly appeared to conflict with
congressional intent regarding interstate pollution.14 The holding
further muddles the D.C. Circuit’s stance with regard to an already
complex statutory framework, and thus harms all parties with an
interest in future interstate pollution regulation.
While the panel’s ruling was likely welcomed by those who
consider increased environmental regulation to be a hindrance upon
future economic development, a closer reading of the majority
opinion suggests that some states, including Louisiana, may be
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1970).
8. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under The Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1191–92 (1995).
9. See Christina C. Caplan, Comment, The Failure of Current Legal and
Regulatory Mechanisms to Control Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for New
National Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 170–71 (2001).
10. See CONRAD SCHNEIDER & JONATHAN BANKS, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,
THE TOLL FROM COAL 4 (Marika Tatsutani, ed., 2010), http://www.catf.us
/resources/publications/files/The_Toll_from_Coal.pdf.
11. Craig N. Oren, Clean Air Interstate Transport: Seeing the Big Picture, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 196, 203 (2002).
12. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
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subject to far harsher interstate pollution regulations in the future.15
The court focused on alerting the EPA as to what data the agency
must gather in order to permissibly regulate interstate air pollution
of the states under the Clean Air Act.16 Specifically, the panel held
that the EPA may only require each state to reduce its own precise
contribution to the interstate pollution problem.17 To be sure, while
it is unclear whether it is even possible for the EPA to make such
determinations, this “relativity requirement” poses serious concerns
to Louisiana.18
Louisiana’s status as a state that both contributes to, and
receives, interstate air pollution suggests that the state will suffer all
of the drawbacks from the EME Homer ruling while gaining none of
the benefits.19 Moreover, as natural gas and coal-fired power plants
are the principal sources of interstate air pollution, it stands that
Louisiana’s electricity sources will likely be subject to far heavier
future regulations in the wake of the ruling.
The prospect of far greater emissions restrictions on Louisiana’s
electricity sources would have significant damaging effects upon the
state due to the character of its major industries. Louisiana’s
economy relies heavily on energy-intensive industries, such as
petrochemical manufacturing20 and petroleum refining and
production,21 making the state among the highest in per capita
energy consumption.22
This Comment argues that the future successful regulation of
interstate air pollution is now clearly in jeopardy because of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision to replace the EPA’s reasonable approach to the
problem with its own misguided policy choices. Part I provides an
overview of the regulatory process under the Clean Air Act and the
specific provisions addressing interstate pollution. Part II examines
the three most recent D.C. Circuit decisions over transport pollution
15. See infra Part III.C.3.
16. Id.
17. See infra Parts III.C.1, III.C.3, IV.
18. See infra Part III.C.3.
19. Id.
20. See Louisiana Industry, DIVISION OF ADMIN. (last visited Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/about_industry.htm (“Louisiana produces 25 percent
of the nation’s petrochemicals. Total value of Louisiana chemical shipments is more
than $14 billion a year.”).
21. See id. (“Louisiana is America’s third largest producer of petroleum and
the third leading state in petroleum refining.”).
22. Louisiana: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (last updated July 2012), http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=LA (“In 2010,
Louisiana ranked third among the States in total energy consumption per capita,
primarily because of the heavy use in the industrial sector, which includes many
refineries and petrochemical plants.”).
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regulations. Part III critically analyzes the EME Homer panel’s
erroneous interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the court’s
misapplication of prior case law, and explores the adverse
consequences this most recent decision poses. Part IV reviews the
legislative history behind congressional statutes involving interstate
pollution and summarizes its apparent conflict with the D.C.
Circuit’s ruling. This part also suggests possible regulatory
approaches the EPA might take to adhere to both the panel’s ruling
and the legislative intent. Part V concludes that, absent the chance of
a successful appeal or legislative revision, the EPA will likely be
unable to implement effective interstate pollution regulations in the
aftermath of EME Homer.
I. THE EPA’S REGULATORY ROLE UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act of 1970 established the federal government’s
powerful role in air pollution regulation.23 Prior to the Act, the
federal government’s function regarding the country’s environment
was largely centered on research.24 While proponents acknowledged
that the federal role in air pollution control would drastically
increase at the expense of the states, it was also stressed that state
participation as implementers of federal standards was crucial to the
Act’s success.25
The Supreme Court, in Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., reiterated these distinct and separate roles of the states
and the EPA under the Clean Air Act.26 From the plain text of the
Act, the Court reasoned that the EPA is charged to set national air
quality standards.27 These air standards are to be set at pollution
levels that the EPA deems necessary to protect the public health.28
However, the Court noted that the statute aimed to limit the EPA to
a secondary role in implementing these air quality standards.29
Because the Act stated that “each State shall have the primary
responsibility of assuring air quality within its boundaries,” the
Court concluded that Congress intended to allow states
“considerable latitude” when implementing these standards.30 Thus,
through the Clean Air Act, Congress devised a cooperative approach
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Dwyer, supra note 8, at 1191.
Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1191–92.
Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 86–87.
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toward pollution control, where both the federal government and
states play important roles.31
A. State Implementation of National Air Quality Standards
Under the Clean Air Act, states assure air quality within their own
boundaries by implementing and enforcing state implementation
plans.32 A state implementation plan, or “SIP,” is the overall
regulatory scheme through which a state controls pollution.33 States
revise their plans either on their own initiative or in response to
federal mandates, such as when the EPA modifies air quality
standards.34 These revisions are then submitted to the EPA, which
must then approve or disapprove of these revisions.35
In some state submittals, the EPA may determine that a group of
submitted state plans are substantially inadequate to meet the
national air quality standards, and thus significant changes are
necessary.36 This process, known as a “SIP Call,”37 allows the EPA
to require states to address these shortcomings.38 The EPA is
obligated to notify these states and afford them an opportunity to
correct inadequacies.39 In the event a state fails to submit an
acceptable plan, the EPA is required to create a federal
implementation plan for that state within two years of finding the
state plan inadequate.40
B. The Good Neighbor Provision
The good neighbor provision requires that states’ implementation
plans include adequate measures which will prevent any “emissions
activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts
which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or
interfere with maintenance by, any other State . . . .”41 In other words,
31. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696
F.3d 7, 11 (2012), cert. granted in part, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
32. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 586–87 (5th
Cir. 1981).
33. Steven G. McKinney & Stephen Gidiere, A (Mostly) Civil War over
Clean Air Act SIPS, 27-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3 (2012).
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5).
37. McKinney & Gidiere, supra note 33, at 2.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
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states are prohibited from interfering with any other state’s ability to
meet national air quality standards. Such interference occurs through
the process of transport pollution or when a state emits air pollutants
that are then blown into other states’ territories.42
The original Clean Air Act of 1970 casually addressed this
problem through a statutory requirement that states engage in
“intergovernmental cooperation” to reduce pollution transport.43
However, this original measure proved completely incapable of
effectively addressing interstate pollution.44 Thus, in 1977, Congress
amended the provision by requiring that states, in their state
implementation plans, prohibit emissions from certain pollution
sources that would “prevent [another state’s] attainment” of federal
air quality standards.45 This revision also proved unsuccessful in
preventing pollution transport. The statutory language required
actual evidence that a polluting state was responsible for another
state’s nonattainment, which was essentially impossible for the EPA
because of the complexity of interstate pollution.46
It was the “downwind” states in the Northeast that, suffering the
brunt of the negative effects posed by transport pollution, pushed for
the current good neighbor provision, which was added to the Clean
Air Act of 1990.47 Specifically, these states experienced increases in
health problems linked to deteriorating air quality48 caused by the
interstate transport of particulate matter pollutants from heavy
polluting coal-burning utilities in the Midwest.49 The heavier
polluting, “upwind” states, in turn argued that, while interstate air
pollution was a significant problem, the burden of reducing such
pollution needed to be shared equally among all states.50 In
response, Congress replaced the “prevent attainment” requirement
with the “significantly contribute” language in order to strengthen
42. See Caplan, supra note 9 , at 171.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(E) (1970).
44. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER §
3.16, at 316 (noting that the 1970 provision “contained some blandishments on
‘intergovernmental cooperation’ that even determined advocacy could not turn
into an enforceable commitment.”).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
(a)(2)(D) (2006)).
46. See id. (noting that “[t]he process reasons for finding few teeth in [the
1977 provision’s] standard of ‘prevention’ of attainment stem from the extreme
difficulties of calculation attending the assessment.”).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (1990).
48. See Oren, supra note 11, at 203 (pointing out that the Harvard School of
Public Health recently linked three hundred premature death and thousands of
emergency room visits to emissions from nine power plants in Chicago).
49. Caplan, supra note 9, at 171.
50. See infra Part IV.
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the enforceability of the good neighbor provision.51 This revision
allowed the EPA to address interstate pollution as a collective
problem, as opposed to the state-specific approach, which the
“prevent attainment” language suggested.52
Because of the complexity associated with interstate pollution,
the problem is not solely a struggle between the Midwestern
polluting states and the affected Eastern states.53 Rather, several
states are both contributors and recipients of transport pollution.54
Predictably, despite Congress’s 1990 statutory change, the
successful enforcement of the good neighbor provision has been rife
with problems for a number of reasons.55 States often have
conflicting social and economic interests with regard to interstate
pollution, resulting in varied degrees of willingness to solve the
problem.56
Moreover, the overall make-up of the Clean Air Act has
expectedly made successful regulation more problematic by
assigning the task of implementing federal standards to the states.57
Specifically, federal regulation of the interstate pollution problem is
difficult because states have tended to aggressively challenge
regulations that they deem contrary to their interests. EPA
regulations that are less restrictive on the polluting states are
predictably challenged by the downwind states for not going far
enough to solve the problem; likewise, upwind states challenge good
neighbor regulations they deem to be overly harsh.58
51. Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone
Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1996).
52. See Michigan v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 213 F.3d 663, 674 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (rejecting the petitioners’ argument that equating the “old standard–‘prevent
attainment’–with the new standard: ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment.’”).
53. Oren, supra note 11, at 203.
54. Id. at 201.
55. See Caplan, supra note 8, at 188 (arguing that the complicated rulemaking
process under the Clean Air Act, the failures of voluntary negotiations between
states, and the consistent availability of judicial review over EPA actions have all
hindered successful regulation of interstate pollution).
56. See id. at 196 (Caplan illustrates that, due to interstate pollution,
Midwestern states do not suffer much of the drawbacks of cheap dirty power; thus,
utilities in these states “have been able to produce electricity at a cheaper price,
and have thus profited at the expense of the strictly controlled utilities in the
Northeast.”).
57. See id. at 191 (pointing out that “the stream of litigation [regarding
interstate pollution] raises a fundamental question about the nature of the current
administrative law system . . . . If every delegation of rulemaking authority to EPA
and every corresponding agency action is challenged in court, the very purposes
and efficiency of delegation are thwarted.”).
58. Compare Michigan v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (where Michigan challenged the EPA rule as exceeding its authority to
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However, when states have sought court protection, judicial
intervention has, more often than not, increased uncertainty in the
application of the good neighbor provision due to the D.C. Circuit’s
inconsistent interpretations of the statute’s “significantly contribute”
language.59 Scholars have noted the difficulty in finding a suitable
definition of “significantly contribute” in the realm of interstate
pollution due to the complexity of transport pollution.60 Indeed, over
the past twelve years, the last three major interstate regulatory
schemes have ended up in the D.C. Circuit, with the court failing to
provide the EPA with a clear understanding as to what is
permissible under the good neighbor provision.
II. D.C. CIRCUIT CASE LAW: THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION
A. Michigan v. EPA
In Michigan v. EPA, the court considered a Final EPA Rule, or
“SIP Call,” which directed twenty-two states, who the EPA deemed
“significant contributors,” to revise their state implementation plans
to eliminate nitrogen oxide emissions by amounts that could be
removed for $2,000 or less per ton.61 The State of Michigan
contended that the rule exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority
under the Clean Air Act.62 Michigan argued that the EPA’s decision
to set a uniform, cost-based reduction for all upwind states would
force some states to reduce their emissions beyond what was
required by the good neighbor provision.63 Further, Michigan
asserted that the EPA’s new procedure of notifying upwind states of
their good neighbor obligations before they were to submit their

regulate the states under the good neighbor provision), with North Carolina v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (where North Carolina argued
the EPA rule did not go far enough in ensuring that upwind states would
adequately reduce their significant contributions as required by the good neighbor
provision).
59. See Matthew D. Tait, Note, A Remedy Even the Plaintiffs Don’t Like. The
D.C. Circuit’s Vacutur of the Clean Air Interstate Rule, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 552, 572 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit case law involving interstate
pollution has “created a large amount of confusion, disarray, and many additional
problems”).
60. See Oren, supra note 11, at 204–07.
61. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 669.
62. See id. at 663.
63. See id. at 679 (where petitioners argued that, under the uniform cost-based
reduction, “even the small contributors must make reductions equivalent to those
achievable by highly cost-effective measures”).
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state implementation plans interfered with the states’ statutory right
to choose how to meet these requirements.64
1. The Majority Opinion
The court rejected Michigan’s cost argument, holding that this
assertion ignored congressional intent behind the amended 1990
good neighbor provision.65 The panel reasoned that the legislature’s
shift added a greater amount of ambiguity to the statute,66
suggesting that Congress did not purport to require that the EPA
determine polluting states solely from their emission levels.67
Moreover, the majority pointed out that the good neighbor provision
contained no express exclusion of considerations of costs.68 Thus,
given the statute’s silence on the issue, the court held that the EPA’s
use of costs was permissible under the good neighbor provision.69
The court also considered Michigan’s assertion that the nitrogen
oxide budget program infringed on the statutory right of the states to
choose how they meet the federal requirements.70 To substantiate
their argument, the petitioners pointed to an earlier D.C. Circuit
decision, Virginia v. EPA, where the court held that the EPA may
not compel states to adopt a specific approach to achieve their
obligations under the Clean Air Act.71 The Michigan court rejected
this argument and held that the budget program did not violate state
autonomy because the rule was merely an EPA recommendation,
not a requirement; therefore, the states were still free to decide how
to meet these emission limits.72

64. Id. at 686.
65. Id. at 674.
66. See id. The majority strongly emphasized Congress’s replacement of the
pre-1990 good neighbor provision’s requirement that EPA may only regulate
interstate emissions that “prevent attainment” with the 1990 language allowing EPA
to regulate states that “contribute significantly” to another state’s nonattainment. The
panel reasoned that the shift towards to a more ambiguous standard aimed to afford
the EPA greater leeway in defining and regulating states that contribute to interstate
pollution.
67. Id. at 677.
68. Id. at 678–79.
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id. at 687–88.
71. See Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 108 F.3d 1397, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(The Act is not a “grant of authority to EPA to require states to insert in their
plans control measures the EPA has selected”).
72. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 687–88.
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2. Judge Sentelle’s Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle took strong issue with the
majority’s willingness to accept the EPA’s consideration of costs in
determining a state’s significant contribution.73 He argued that, as
indicated by the text of the good neighbor provision, Congress
clearly intended that such significant contributions be determined
based solely on state emissions that affected the pollution levels in
other states.74 In support of this argument, Judge Sentelle cited the
circuit’s decision in Ethyl Crop v. EPA, where the court struck down
an EPA rule, holding that where “[t]he plain language of the
provision makes [it] clear that . . . decisions are to be based on one
criterion,” the EPA cannot base its decision on another criteria.75
B. North Carolina v. EPA
In North Carolina v. EPA, petitioners challenged the EPA’s
Clean Air Interstate Rule and its method for quantifying state
contributions.76 In the rule, the EPA did not measure each upwind
state’s actual contributions, but instead assigned the states initial
emission targets based on each particular state’s costs of reduction.
Further, the rule established a cap-and-trade system of interstate
allowance trading which enabled all major power plants to freely
trade emission allowances in order to comply with emission
standards.77
North Carolina, as a downwind state, argued that the Clean Air
Interstate Rule did not adequately ensure that the significant
contributions to the pollution levels of downwind states would be
eliminated.78 Principally, North Carolina argued that the EPA’s
regional approach toward eliminating upwind pollution, by not
requiring elimination on a state-by-state basis, did not go as far as
the good neighbor provision required.79
The court unanimously struck down the rule for exceeding the
EPA’s authority under the good neighbor provision.80 The court
reasoned that, because the rule’s cap-and-trade system allowed
unlimited allowance trading between states, it failed to ensure that
73.
74.
75.
76.
2008).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 695 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
Id. at 696.
Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 906–07.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 921.
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each state’s respective significant contribution would be eliminated
as statutorily required.81 The court aptly pointed out that a state
could evade its good neighbor obligation if the power plants within
that state simply purchased enough emission credits.82
Further, the court stated that the Clean Air Interstate Rule’s
system of allocating emissions credits was based on impermissible
cost considerations.83 The program allocated fewer emission credits
to states that could control emissions more cheaply.84 As a result,
states with gas-fired and oil-fired power sources, whose emissions
were less costly to control, were shouldered with greater reduction
obligations than those with coal-fired sources.85 The court
considered such a system impermissible when the statute required
that each state individually eliminate its own contribution.86
The North Carolina decision raised serious doubts as to whether
the EPA could maintain a cap-and-trade system under the good
neighbor provision.87 To be sure, the ruling certainly suggested that
the EPA must restrict interstate allowance trading and place actual
emission limits on state contributions for such a system to be
lawful.88 Moreover, the D.C. panel’s rejection of the Clean Air
Interstate Rule posited an extremely difficult challenge for the EPA
in formulating a permissible interstate rule under the Clean Air Act.
Specifically, the EPA was required to replace the Rule with
interstate regulations that would not be considered overbearing
towards the upwind states while simultaneously ensuring that the
new regulations would adequately protect the downwind states as
the good neighbor provision required.
C. EME Homer City Generation L.P. v. EPA
In response to the North Carolina ruling, the EPA formulated
the Transport Rule, its most recent effort to issue regulations in
compliance with the good neighbor provision.89 The EPA, through
air quality monitoring, first determined the states that would be
81. Elizabeth Kruse, Case Comment, North Carolina v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 283, 287 (2009).
82. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 907.
83. Id. at 921.
84. Id. at 920.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 921.
87. Brian H. Potts, The Dirty Climate Debate, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 5
(2010).
88. Id.
89. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug.
8, 2011) codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).
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considered significant contributors.90 Next, the EPA established a
uniform, cost-based reduction scheme similar to the nitrogen oxide
budget program in Michigan.91 These cost-based thresholds were
determined through computer modeling, which suggested the
thresholds in which downwind states’ air quality problems would be
alleviated.92
The Transport Rule also limited the ability of power plants to
trade allowances using three important measures.93 First, the rule
included strict penalties for power plants that exceeded their
allowable pollution levels.94 This induced utilities to hold on to their
allowances in order to avoid penalties if they exceeded emission
levels.95 Next, the rule severely restricted the buying and selling of
allowances between different states.96 Lastly, the EPA prohibited
utilities from using allowance credits from the Clean Air Interstate
Rule to meet the early emission requirements of the Transport
Rule.97
As the EPA stated in its published Transport Rule, the agency
considered its approach to comply with both the Michigan and
North Carolina interpretations of the good neighbor provision.98
First, the EPA claimed it had “faithfully responded to the cited
aspects of North Carolina” by refraining from setting emission
budgets based on the states’ pollution control costs and severely
limiting the interstate trading of allowances.99 Moreover, the
Transport Rule’s approach was consistent with the Michigan
decision, as it used air-quality monitoring at the outset to determine
90. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7,
15–16 (2012), cert. granted in part, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
91. See id. at 16–18. EPA imposed a $500 cost per ton threshold on all
upwind states. For sulfur dioxide, the EPA divided the upwind states into two
groups, as computer modeling suggested one group contributing significantly
more sulfur dioxide in transport. The EPA imposed a $2,300 cost per ton threshold
for the heavier polluting group and a $500 cost per ton threshold for the lesser
polluting group. Id.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Brian H. Potts, The Practical, Legal and Equitable Problems with EPA’s
New Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 24 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 13 (2011).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48, 211
(Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).
99. Brief for Respondents at 24, EME Homer Generation L.P. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302), 2012 WL 4754616, at *24.
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which states were significant contributors.100 Furthermore, the
EPA’s use of uniform-cost reductions was consistent with the
regulations approved in the Michigan decision.101
The EPA also deviated from its previous approaches by
concurrently releasing states’ significant contributions and the
federal plan stipulating how the states were to reduce these
contributions.102 Unlike the rules at issue in Michigan and North
Carolina, the Transport Rule ultimately never gave states the
opportunity to choose how they would meet these emission
requirements. Instead, these states became subject to the mandatory
federal requirements in the Transport Rule following its
promulgation.103
In defending this approach, the EPA pointed to the states’ clear
failure to submit adequate state implementation plans as required by
the Clean Air Act.104 The EPA emphasized that nothing in the Clean
Air Act made these state plan submissions dependent on any prior
action by the EPA.105 The EPA also pointed to the Clean Air Act’s
mandate that the EPA promulgate an adequate federal
implementation plan in the event the states fail to do so.106 Lastly,
the EPA pointed to the North Carolina panel’s directive to the
agency to quickly remedy the flaws in the Clean Air Interstate
Rule.107 Nevertheless, a number of power and coal companies, labor
unions, trade associations, states, and local governments petitioned
for judicial review following the Transport Rule’s issuance.108
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority struck down the Transport Rule.109 First, the court
held that the Transport Rule exceeded EPA authority under the
Clean Air Act according to the prior statutory interpretations in
Michigan and North Carolina.110 The court acknowledged that,
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id.
102. EME Homer City Generation L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7, 18–
19 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
103. Id.
104. Brief for Respondents, supra note 96, at 28–30.
105. Id. at 40.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006).
107. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,211
(Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).
108. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 19.
109. Id. at 38.
110. Id. at 23.
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while the Michigan court allowed the EPA to consider costs in
determining significant contributions, the North Carolina decision
qualified this ruling by holding that cost considerations could be
used only to lower an upwind state’s obligation.111 The court
reasoned that the Transport Rule, by imposing uniform cost
requirements on all states no matter the actual amount of their
significant contributions, could result in some states making
reductions in excess of that required by the statute.112
Second, the majority argued that the EPA’s simultaneous release
of significant contributions and the federal implementation plan
conflicted with the cooperative aim of the Clean Air Act.113 In
support, the court noted that the good neighbor provision was
located in the section of the Clean Air Act relating to the states,
which suggested Congress intended this to be a state
responsibility.114 Furthermore, the court cited the Virginia decision,
where the court interpreted this section as a “federalism bar” that
prevents the EPA from using the state implementation plan process
to compel states to adopt specific control measures.115 Since this
EPA action essentially made it impossible for states to submit an
adequate plan by which to meet these good neighbor requirements,
the court held that it infringed upon the states’ delegated role under
the Act.116
Lastly, the panel held that the EPA’s method of determining
significant contributions violated the good neighbor provision’s
mandate that a state be required to only make reductions equal to its
own “significant contribution.”117 The panel’s “relativity
requirement” meant that the EPA, in determining an upwind state’s
contribution to a downwind state’s nonattainment, must factor in the
relative contributions of other upwind states to that nonattainment,
as well as the downwind state’s own contribution to its
nonattainment.118 The court reasoned that the EPA’s uniform cost
determination method clearly failed to account for these other
considerations.119

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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2. Judge Rogers’ Dissent
Judge Rogers penned a heated dissent in which she argued that
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the petitioners
raised an untimely challenge.120 Furthermore, she stressed that, even
if jurisdiction had been proper, the invalidation of the Transport
Rule was based on a faulty construction of the Clean Air Act and
prior case law.121
In her jurisdictional argument, Judge Rogers pointed to the clear
judicial petition requirements of the Clean Air Act: petitioners
wanting to challenge a final EPA determination must do so within
sixty days of receiving such notice.122 In Judge Rogers’ view, the
time to bring a challenge to the Transport Rule occurred when the
EPA published its findings that the state implementation plans were
inadequate in meeting good neighbor contributions.123 She further
emphasized that these published findings rejected state objections
that the EPA was statutorily required to notify the states of their
good neighbor obligations before releasing a mandatory federal
implementation plan.124 Since the sixty-day period had long since
expired before the EPA implemented the Transport Rule, she argued
that the petitioners had lost their chance for judicial review.125 Judge
Rogers warned that the majority opinion ignored the two important
policy reasons behind these strict procedural rules.126 First, these
rules “enforce repose,” so that agency rulemaking is not hindered by
unexpected challenges.127 Second, the statute aims to ensure an
agency’s assessment and subsequent corrections of the rule before
the issue goes to court.128
Judge Rogers also disagreed with the majority rationale that the
EPA was mandated to prospectively alert states of their significant
contributions in light of the Michigan decision.129 She emphasized
that, in Michigan, the court only held that the EPA acted permissibly
in choosing to alert the states of their significant contributions before
state implementation plans were to be submitted for agency
review.130 Thus, she considered the majority to have erroneously
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 38 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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applied Michigan as its basis for holding that the EPA was now
required to prospectively alert states of their significant
contributions before reviewing state implementation plans.131
Judge Rogers further rejected the majority’s statutory analysis
that concluded that the Clean Air Act required the EPA to
prospectively alert the states.132 She argued that the majority, in
effect, rewrote 42 U.S.C. Section 7410(c) by finding such a
requirement when nothing in that provision expressly includes such
an obligation.133 Judge Rogers stressed that such an analysis
conflicted with the established judicial interpretive principal
regarding administrative statutes, in which the court is “not to
correct the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes.”134 In
her view, the majority application conflicted with the congressional
aims behind the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, which intended to
strengthen EPA regulatory authority because the states themselves
had consistently failed to curb interstate pollution.135
While Judge Rogers conceded that the EPA had previously
allowed states the opportunity to submit state plans after releasing
contribution amounts, she stressed that an agency may depart from
previous rule interpretations if it presents “good reasons” for doing
so.136 She argued that there were such reasons to support the EPA’s
interpretive change in this instance.137 Justice Rogers particularly
focused on the fact that the court in North Carolina had remanded
rather then struck down the Clean Air Interstate Rule and that it
“emphasized EPA’s obligation to remedy [the Rule’s] flaws
expeditiously.”138
Because of the complex nature of interstate air pollution, there is
a common link between these three most recent D.C. Circuit
decisions over the matter: all three cases involved judicial
examination of immensely detailed EPA regulations relating to a
131. Id.
132. Id. at 45–46.
133. Id. at 46.
134. Id. at 48 (citing Virginia Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
135. Id. at 60.
136. Id. at 50.
137. See id. (emphasizing that the EPA chose to issue the federal plan because
“it had no authority to alter the statutory deadlines for SIP submissions and that
the [Clean Air Act] did not require it to issue a rule quantifying States’ good
neighbor obligations.”).
138. Id. at 50–51 (quoting Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,208, 48,211 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78,
97).(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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multi-faceted environmental problem. For these reasons, a concrete
legal standard as to what is permissible under the good neighbor
provision has not emerged after over a decade of jurisprudence over
the issue.
III. THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE EME HOMER RULING
This Comment will now analyze the D.C. panel’s arguably
flawed interpretation and application of the good neighbor provision
in the EME Homer ruling, will relate it to the prior Michigan and
North Carolina decisions, and discuss how that decision creates a
number of adverse effects for successful future regulations.
The majority opinion in EME Homer serves to bring further
confusion to an already inconsistent body of case law regarding the
good neighbor provision. Such a decision reiterates the idea that the
D.C. Circuit has continually failed to ascertain, or even agree on, the
true congressional intent behind this provision. This is evident from
the fact that the EME Homer panel frequently referred to the
Michigan ruling though a substantially similar rule was upheld in
that case.139 Moreover, the court in EME Homer cited extensively to
North Carolina for support despite the fact that the Transport Rule
differs significantly from the Clean Air Interstate Rule addressed in
that previous case.140 This uncertainty was further exacerbated by
the majority’s erroneous use of both decisions to substantiate its
rejection of the Transport Rule.
A. Applying Michigan
The court often referenced Michigan in its rejection of the
EPA’s cost-based approach in the Transport Rule as a primary
reason for disproving the EPA’s simultaneous release of the federal
implementation plan and the states’ contributions.141 It must be
pointed out, however, that the EME Homer court failed to explain
how the Michigan court’s belief that the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments expanded EPA regulatory authority over interstate
pollution did not conflict with its current opinion, which severely
restricted EPA authority over the same subject.142
First, the majority’s use of Michigan to support the principle that
the EPA may only consider costs to “further lower an individual
139. Id. at 27-30.
140. Id. at 25–27.
141. Id. at 27–30.
142. See id. at 48 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority holding
was “entirely at odds with the holding in Michigan”).
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State’s obligations,”143 wholly ignores the Michigan court’s
substantive discussion on that issue. The Michigan court concluded
that, only in the absence of legislative preclusion, the EPA could
factor in cost considerations to determine significant contributions.144
The Michigan ruling never suggested that such considerations might
only be used to lower a state’s good neighbor obligation as the
majority concluded. Moreover, several petitioners in Michigan
unsuccessfully argued that, since the program imposed a uniform
cost reduction requirement on all upwind states, those states with
minimal contributions would be forced to shoulder a greater
reduction obligation.145 The fact that the Michigan court actually
considered and rejected the same argument clearly indicates the
decision is antithetical to the majority’s proposition.
Next, the majority asserted that the EPA is obligated under the
Clean Air Act to prospectively inform states of their contributions
before requiring submissions of state implementation plans for
review.146 It was reasoned that, since the Michigan court held that
the EPA acted permissibly under the statute when it alerted the
states before requiring submissions, the EPA was now required to
take this approach in determining good neighbor obligations.147 The
majority decision held that what was deemed a permissible EPA
action under Michigan was now a mandatory obligation of the EPA.
However, this again underscores the court’s flawed understanding
and application of that decision.
B. Applying North Carolina
The court often pointed to the North Carolina holding as a basis
for rejecting the Transport Rule.148 Principally, the majority relied
on North Carolina to further support its point that the EPA could not
143. Id. at 21–22.
144. Michigan v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 213 F.3d 663, 679 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
145. Id.
146. See EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 28 (noting that, “[w]hen the EPA defines
States’ good neighbor obligations [under the Clean Air Act], it must give the
States the first opportunity to implement the new requirements”).
147. Compare Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 687 (“EPA permissibly relied on
its general rule rulemaking authority to prospectively inform the states of EPA’s
significance determinations), with EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 28 (“When EPA
defines States’ good neighbor obligations, it must give the States the first
opportunity to implement the new requirements”).
148. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 23 (“The Transport Rule is flawed because the
requirement that EPA impose on upwind States was not based on the ‘amounts’
from upwind States that ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ in downwind
States, as required by the statute and our decision in North Carolina.”).
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use costs in a way that would increase a state’s obligation under the
good neighbor provision.149 Again, such an application misconstrues
the actual holding in North Carolina.
The North Carolina court’s invalidation of the Clean Air
Interstate Rule centered around the issue that the EPA assigned
emission reduction requirements based solely on how cheaply a
state could make such reductions.150 Under the rule, states with more
oil- and gas-powered utilities (states that could reduce emissions
more cheaply) were subject to larger reduction requirements than
states with mainly coal-fired utilities whose reductions were more
costly.151 The court argued that the result of such an allocation
method would be that “states with mainly oil- and gas-fired
[utilities] will subsidize reductions in states with mainly coal-fired
[utilities].”152
The majority in EME Homer applied the North Carolina holding
to support its own conclusion that cost considerations could never be
used to increase an upwind state’s obligation; rather, cost
considerations could be used only to reduce a state’s obligation.153
Such reasoning obviously misconstrues the North Carolina decision
and the Clean Air Interstate Rule it addressed. The North Carolina
court simply made the sensible point that, as a result of cost
considerations, the rule as it stood would unfairly shift the reduction
burden to the detriment of certain states.154
The burden-shifting element of the Clean Air Interstate Rule was
notably absent from the Transport Rule, which imposed nearly
uniform cost reductions on all upwind states.155 However, the
majority in EME Homer still reasoned that the North Carolina
decision was entirely relevant to reject the Transport Rule.156
Moreover, the majority undermined its own application of North
Carolina when remarking that the Michigan decision, in upholding
the nitrogen oxide budget rule with similar uniform cost
requirements, stood for the legitimate proposition that the EPA may
use costs “in a way that benefits some [] States more than others.”157

149.
150.
2008).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
2000)).

Id. at 21.
North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 919–20 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 919–20.
Id. at 921.
EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 21.
North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 921.
EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 16.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 21–22 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 679 (D.C. Cir.
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However the EME Homer court failed to explain why this Michigan
principle was not also furthered in the very similar Transport Rule.
C. Potential Effects in the Aftermath of EME Homer
While the challengers of the Transport Rule likely viewed the
EME Homer decision as an important victory against overly
intrusive federal regulation, the ruling poses serious concerns
regarding the future success of interstate pollution regulation. First,
the decision forces the EPA to begin from scratch in devising a new
transport pollution plan, which will likely take several years to
develop and implement.158 Such an extensive delay will likely have
significant economic effects as electric utilities will likely be
discouraged from investing in emissions reductions due to the
uncertainty of future regulation. Moreover, by invalidating the
Transport Rule, the EME Homer decision created clear winners and
losers between the states, with Louisiana potentially being among
the biggest losers.159 Such a plethora of serious problems evidences
a clear need for substantial changes in interstate pollution regulation.
1. Effects on EPA Transport Pollution Regulations
The EPA is now charged with formulating a new transport
pollution rule that fits under the Clean Air Act’s statutory
framework as interpreted by the EME Homer panel. Specifically,
this means complying with the following three principal directives
emphasized by the court. First, the EPA must determine states’ good
neighbor initial emission requirements based on the states’ total
significant contributions to non-attainment in other states.160 Next,
under the EME Homer majority’s proportionality requirement,161 an
upwind state’s contribution must be adjusted in light of the other
states’ share of contributions, as well as a downwind state’s relative
contributions to its own non-attainment.162 Lastly, the EPA must
abandon its federal implementation plan approach by giving the
states a chance to implement the reduction requirements.163 The
158. See Brian H. Potts, The Court Kills EPA’s Cross State Air Pollution RuleBut What States Really Won?, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 36, 40 (2012) (“Unless Congress
intervenes with new legislation or an EPA appeal is successful, the replacement
rule will . . . probably not require actual compliance until sometime between 2016
and 2018.”).
159. Id. at 42.
160. Id. at 41.
161. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 26–27.
162. Potts, supra note 158, at 41.
163. Id. at 40.
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EME Homer panel’s questionable rejection of the Transport Rule
clearly begs the question of whether it is even possible for the EPA
to implement a rule that would survive judicial review.
An issue of particular concern in future successful regulation is
the panel’s proportionality directive. Specifically, the EPA, from its
own analyses of alternative transport control methods, has
questioned whether such a requirement is even feasible.164 In her
dissent, Judge Rogers made the very logical point that the
requirement that the EPA engage in such detailed air quality
analysis conflicted with the majority’s larger holding that the EPA
avoid collective “over-control” within the states.165 Lastly, such a
requirement further burdens the EPA’s already difficult task of
regulating an immensely complex problem.
Further, absent the slim chance of new federal legislation or a
successful EPA appeal, the panel’s mandate that the EPA give states
the initial opportunity to submit state implementation plans pushes
back the timeline for new transport regulation.166 It is likely that the
EPA will give the states at least two or three years to submit plans
for approval after it finalizes a new rule.167 As a result, states will
likely not need to be in compliance with the new regulations until
sometime between 2016 and 2018.168
2. Effects on Pollution Control Investments
The EME Homer decision will also likely discourage utility
company investments in emission controls for the foreseeable
future. This is largely because the decision creates uncertainty as to
the character and direction of transport pollution regulation.169 It is
impossible to determine what risk such expenditures entail in the
face of unknown regulations, so companies will refrain from making
capital investments in power plant environmental controls.
In contrast to the common belief that power companies lose
money when having to invest in pollution controls, many utilities
often profit by making prudent capital pollution control
164. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, EME Homer City Generation L.P. v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302), 2012 WL
4748805, at *14.
165. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 40 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
166. Potts, supra note 158, at 40.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Potts, supra note 87, at 2 (“Without knowing the specifics of climate
change regulation and how it will affect their plants’ economic lives, it is difficult, if
not impossible, for utilities and state commissions to decide whether and when . . .
pollution controls should be installed”).
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investments.170 However, in order for these companies to determine
whether this spending is worthwhile, detailed analyses must be
conducted in order to predict the costs and expected benefits of
employing new emissions controls.171 The most important factors in
making such determinations include fuel prices, cost per ton
amounts, and pollutant allowance prices.172 Because changes in
environmental regulation could drastically affect these factors,
companies must know the extent of EPA rules governing power
plants to determine whether such investments are economically
prudent.173 Thus, the regulatory unpredictability in the wake of EME
Homer will deter the installation of pollution controls by the utility
companies.
3. Effects on Louisiana
The EME Homer panel’s directive that the EPA, in determining
a state’s significant contribution, must account for the relative
contributions of the other states, creates clear winners and losers in
the wake of the decision.174 More importantly, the decision suggests
the likelihood of drastically increased pollution regulation in a few
of the biggest losing states,175 including Louisiana.
Specifically, these states share three characteristics indicating
that they will be subject to the heaviest regulations under the EME
Homer panel’s “relativity” requirement. First, these states contribute
substantially to pollution levels in other states.176 Second, these
states are also recipients of transport pollution from other states.177
Lastly, these states have a substantial part in their own failures to
meet national air quality levels because of their high in-state
emissions.178

170. See id. at 5. State utility commissioners set rates based largely on the
operating costs and capital costs of utilities. Operating costs include such expenses
as employee salaries, fuel costs and taxes and are generally passed on to the
consumers. Capital costs are the capital utilities invest in their plants, including
pollution control investments. For these costs, utilities are allowed to include a
return on the non-depreciated value of their capital assets. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Potts, supra note 158, at 41.
175. See id. at 42 (noting that “Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama,
and Louisiana are the biggest losers as between the states under the [EME Homer]
decision”).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Louisiana, as the nation’s largest ozone contributor to other
states nonattainment,179 along with playing a large part in the states’
failure in meeting its own ozone level,180 may possibly be the
biggest loser from the EME Homer decision. Consequently, the state
can expect that, if the EPA indeed promulgates a rule in compliance
with the court’s holding, far greater reduction requirements in future
regulations will follow. The prospect of harsher restrictions upon
Louisiana’s pollution sources would likely have significant effects
upon both the state and the country as a whole. Increased emissions
reductions would jeopardize the viability of the Louisiana economy
due to the energy intensive industries upon which the state
depends.181 Because of Louisiana’s national importance as a leading
producer of both petrochemicals182 and petroleum,183 increased
regulations would also have widespread impacts around the country.
Indeed, the EME Homer ruling (and the rationale supporting it)
harms both the regulators and the regulated with regards to interstate
pollution. The court’s muddled application of statutory and case law
casts an uncertain cloud on future regulation, to the detriment of all
interested parties.
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL AIM BEHIND THE GOOD NEIGHBOR
PROVISION
The Congressional Reports regarding the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments provide a meaningful glimpse into the legislators’
respective intentions of the revisions involving interstate air
pollution. Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, a downwind
state, argued that the expansion of the EPA’s regulatory authority
over interstate pollution was necessary to incentivize the states into
reducing pollution that affected other states.184 In opposing the
revisions, Senator Rockefeller of West Virginia, an upwind state,
emphasized that the proposed changes placed too great a burden on
179. See id. (noting that Louisiana, which contributes 8.0 (ppb) in transport
pollution, is the highest upwind contributor of ozone to the levels in downwind
states).
180. See id. at 43 (noting that Louisiana contributes the largest amount to its
own failure to meet air quality levels for ozone, emitting 39.7 (ppb) to its own
non-attainment).
181. See supra notes 20-22.
182. See supra note 20.
183. See supra note 21.
184. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16895-01 (remarking that the Amendments “put[]
some responsibility on the States to be good neighbors. . . . This provision
guarantees that if the States sending pollution into Connecticut are not doing their
jobs in controlling pollution, Connecticut will be assured that the Federal
Government will step in and do the job.” (quoting Senator Lieberman)).
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the polluting states requiring that they “pay more than [their] fair
share.”185
The Amendments passed, indicating that, by 1990, Congress
understood that interstate air pollution was a serious problem
requiring a substantial policy change. The good neighbor
provision’s amended language reflected this view.186 By adopting
the more ambiguous “contribute significantly” language and
expanding the provision’s application to a greater amount of
emissions activities, Congress intended a greater federal regulatory
role.187
A. The D.C. Circuit Failed to Defer to the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Delegated Authority
With the 1990 Amendments, Congress aimed to approach
interstate air pollution as a nationwide problem. The EME Homer
court, by strongly reiterating the states’ role within the Clean Air
Act,188 appeared to blatantly ignore this specific legislative intent.
The court’s decision to disregard Congress’ focus on a nationwide
solution was further accompanied by the court’s willingness to
ignore established principles of judicial restraint within
administrative law.189
The Supreme Court ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., served as a natural reaction to the
general character of judicial review in the area of administrative law
during the 1970s and 1980s.190 During that period, the lower federal
185. Id.
186. See Wilcox, supra note 49, at 30 (“The changes Congress enacted in the
1990 CAA indicate that it was aware of the significant problem caused by ozone
transport.”).
187. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(E) (1977) (“prohibiting [emissions from]
any stationary source within the state . . . which will . . . prevent attainment or
maintenance by any other State”) (emphasis added), with 42 U.S.C. 7410
(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1990) (“prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this
[subchapter], any source or other type of emissions activity within the State . . .
which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State”) (emphasis added).
188. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 28.
189. See Virginia Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 926 (“Our role is not to correct the text so that it
better serves the statute’s purposes; nor under Chevron may we avoid the
Congressional intent clearly expressed in the text simply by asserting that [our]
preferred preference would be better policy.” (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S.
Envt. Prot. Agency, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
190. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and
the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 739 (2002) (“In 1984,
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courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, often struggled in clearly
defining the scope of review regarding administrative regulations.191
In Chevron, the Court aimed to reign in the lower courts from
exercising overly intrusive judicial review over regulations that
either complied with, or did not conflict with, congressional intent
behind administrative statutes.192
The Court thus formulated a two-step approach designed to
increase judicial deference toward agency rulemaking authority.193
First, the court is to determine whether “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.”194 If so, then the reviewing
court must enforce that clear legislative intent.195 However, in the
event that the intent is not clear from the statute, the reviewing court
must uphold the agency’s interpretation if it is “reasonable.”196
Moreover, even if the court does not consider the agency
interpretation to be the best policy in addressing the specific issue,
the court still must uphold a reasonable agency rule.197 The Court
reasoned that the “wisdom of such policy choices” is not judicial,
but political questions, and should be resolved in the political
branches.198
By holding the Transport Rule impermissible under the Clean
Air Act and instructing the EPA to formulate a rule according to its
own interpretation of the good neighbor provision, the EME Homer
panel blatantly ignored the Chevron principle. The legislative
history of the 1990 Clean Air Act unquestionably shows that
Congress, in recognizing the severity and complexity of the
interstate pollution problem, intended to accord the EPA greater
authority in its regulation.
The EME Homer panel’s rejection of the Transport Rule
replaces the EPA’s policy choices with the court’s own. Further, the
unelected panel’s infringement on the EPA’s policy-making role is
the Supreme Court restated the general rule that agencies, and not courts, enjoy
responsibility for interpreting ambiguous statutes.”).
191. Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1216 (1992) (“The Circuit struggled throughout the 1970’s
and 80’s to discharge its administrative review functions capably.”).
192. See id. at 1218 (“In three landmark cases the Court has reversed the
Circuit for engaging in unduly intrusive review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the Court instructed reviewing courts to defer
strongly to an agency’s interpretation of its statute.”).
193. Id. at 842.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 842–43.
196. Id. at 843.
197. Id. at 865–66.
198. Id. at 866.
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only worsened by the fact that the court’s own preferences,
particularly the panel’s “relativity requirement,” appear unsupported
by Congress.
The EME Homer panel’s requirement that the EPA, in
determining a specific state’s significant contribution must take into
account the relative emissions from all other upwind and downwind
states, failed to consider the impact of the 1990 good neighbor
provision. As the Michigan court alluded, by adopting the
“contribute significantly” standard, Congress moved away from the
causation-based approach in order to expand state and EPA
authority to regulate in this area.199 The D.C. Circuit’s failure to
understand the complexity involved in the interstate pollution
problem is evident considering that the EPA argued that such an
approach is likely impossible. Moreover, this relativity requirement,
if allowed to stand, leaves the EPA far more vulnerable to future
challenges, as the agency will be burdened with expressly showing
how it determined each precise significant contribution level
through environmental data.
B. The EME Homer Panel’s Ruling Incents States to Challenge
Future Regulation
The EME Homer court’s emphasis on the cooperative nature of
the Clean Air Act suggests that future interstate pollution regulation
will be consistently hampered by judicial challenges. Indeed,
Congress envisioned a cooperative relationship between the states
and the federal government, acknowledging that both were needed
to reduce air pollution.200 However, it is also true that Congress
recognized that some air pollution problems, because of their
national scope, are often better solved through increased federal
involvement.201 The particular nature of transport pollution clearly
places it in this latter category.
199. See Wilcox, supra note 51, at 32 (arguing that, under the 1977 provision,
“EPA arguably could not halt emissions of a pollutant in one state unless it was
the sole cause of nonattainment in another.” However, the 1990 provision
indicates “that EPA may halt emissions that are simply a contributing factor in
another state’s nonattainment.”).
200. See Dwyer, supra note 8 at 1191–92 (“The legislators who championed
the 1970 amendments contemplated that the federal regulatory role would increase
substantially at the expense of the states, but they also ensured that the states
would have a substantial role in implementing and enforcing the federal
program.”).
201. An example is the acid rain trading program included in the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments. That program established a nationwide flexible cap-andtrade program for sulfur dioxide allowances resulting in drastic reductions in
nationwide emissions levels. Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Results, U.S.
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Interstate pollution is not only a national problem, but because of
the various effects it poses to different states and regions, legislative
measures addressing the problem are highly controversial. Since
states have different incentives in regulating interstate pollution,202
compromise is often difficult or impossible. It logically follows that a
cooperative-based approach will be inefficient to solve such a
problem. Congress recognized this issue and opted to shift greater
authority towards the federal government in order to better solve
trans-boundary pollution.
The EME Homer court’s reliance on the state’s role within the
good neighbor provision ignores the clear legislative intent in the
1990 good neighbor provision. The panel continually emphasized
that the EPA acted impermissibly in simultaneously releasing the
significant contribution amounts and the federal implantation
plan.203 However, as the EPA remarked, the federal implementation
plan was largely in response to the complete failure of the upwind
states in making adequate reductions.204 This clear unwillingness on
the part of the states was precisely what Congress aimed to remedy
through the 1990 Amendments.205 In reinforcing the states’ role
within the Clean Air Act, the panel’s decision provides the states
with substantial leverage in future judicial disputes over the good
neighbor provision. In this light, the decision ignites a major
problem involved in interstate pollution, which Congress clearly
aimed to remedy.
C. Salvaging Interstate Pollution Regulation and Congressional
Intent
Absent legislative clarification or a reversal of the EME Homer
panel, the EPA must now formulate a new transport rule pursuant to
the strict direction of the D.C. Circuit. It appears that the EPA’s best
chance of formulating a rule within the court’s relativity requirement

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last visited October 9, 2013), http://www.epa.gov
/capandtrade/documents/ctresults.pdf.
202. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 195.
203. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7,
28–32 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EME Homer
City Generation, L.P. 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
204. See id. at 31 (“EPA here made ‘a finding of failure to submit and/or
disapproved a SIP submission’ for each State with respect to each NAAQS for
which that State would be covered. . . . On the basis of those findings, EPA
asserted authority to issue the Transport Rule FIPs.”).
205. Id. at 60 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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would incorporate a “command and control” method of regulation.206
Under such an approach, the EPA would carefully detail the exact
emissions reductions of each upwind state, and then mandate those
states meet those emissions caps. However, such regulation programs
are routinely criticized by economists because of their high
administrative costs and for being far less efficient than incentivebased programs such as emissions trading.207
The EPA may also be able to implement a permissible transport
scheme involving intrastate emissions credit trading programs.
Under these programs, pollution sources could undertake projects
that reduce emissions and then obtain EPA approval to sell those
emissions to other sources within the same state that cannot meet
emission standards. This would allow certain states a limited amount
of flexibility in meeting the state-focused reduction budgets
mandated in EME Homer. However, such a trading program would
only work in those states with diversified pollution sources where
those who can reduce emissions more cheaply are encouraged to
invest in pollution control and sell surplus emissions to other
sources. Moreover, these sorts of programs contain several
drawbacks not shared in traditional cap-and-trade systems.208
Lastly, the EPA could possibly incorporate a modified cap-andtrade scheme into the next Transport Rule. For such a system to
comply with EME Homer, trading would have to be strictly limited
between states. The trading system could allow upwind states to
only purchase excess allowances from the downwind states they
pollute. Thus, in the event an upwind state pollution source
exceeded its allowable emissions and needed to purchase allowances
to cover this excess, forcing the source to purchase from a
downwind source would offset this increased contribution.
However, such a trading program is likely unfeasible, as it would
add greater complexity to the EPA’s already immensely difficult
task after EME Homer.
The limited amount of expensive and inefficient regulatory
schemes from which the EPA must choose after EME Homer further
suggests that the decision conflicts with both legislative intent and
206. Potts, supra note 158, at 43.
207. Byron Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities and Opportunities,
20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 8–9 (2005).
208. See id. at 8–9. The author points to three problems with credit trading
programs. First, it is not certain whether the emissions source would have made
the reduction anyway; thus, in the event the credit is given, emissions levels are
increased, undermining the environmental legitimacy of the program. Second,
measurement protocols are often not standard, so the regulators generally end up
having to accept the trader’s proposed methodology. Lastly, transaction costs of
trading are usually high which discourages the amount of trading between sources.
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common sense. It would be absurd to assume that Congress, in
addressing interstate pollution, intended to burden the EPA with
unnecessary hurdles. Rather, Congress saw interstate pollution for
what it was: a nation-wide problem, demanding a collective approach.
What also must be acknowledged, and something Congress very
likely understood, is that many heavy polluting industries are of vital
national importance. Thus, by allowing the EPA to address interstate
pollution through nationally- or regionally-based trading programs,
certain polluters would be encouraged to make emissions reductions
that benefit industry while also effectively addressing the pollution
problem. The EME Homer panel apparently did not agree.
CONCLUSION
Time and again, judicial review in the administrative realm is
described as inconsistent and uncertain. The Court, in Chevron, aimed
to remedy this inconsistency by creating a presumption of judicial
deference towards agency action. Alas, courts have reverted back to
replacing an agency’s policy choices with its own in the review of
administrative actions despite the twenty-five-year-old decision of
Chevron. Such behavior characterized the EME Homer panel’s
decision to put its own spin on the good neighbor provision’s
“significantly contribute” language. Thus, the EPA is sent back to the
drawing board in attempt to formulate a rule consistent with the
court’s, not the legislature’s, definition of that language. So now who
is deferring to whom?
Alexander Bickel, in his critique of judicial activism tells us that
“[t]he root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian
force in our system.”209 Nowhere is the principal of judicial restraint
more important than in the administrative law context. Congress
accords substantial powers to the EPA because the agency is faced
with addressing nationwide environmental issues. As such, the EPA
is charged with formulating policies that protect the environmental
health of the country without crippling the energy-intensive industries
that are vital to a healthy economy. It is both a difficult and delicate
task, which is certainly not aided by overly intrusive judicial review.
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